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ABSTRACT
The European Parliament’s proposal to create a new legal status
for artificial intelligence (AI) and robots brought into focus the
idea of electronic legal personhood. This discussion, however, is
hugely controversial. While some scholars argue that the proposed
status could contribute to the coherence of the legal system, others
say that it is neither beneficial nor desirable. Notwithstanding this
prospect, we conducted a survey (N=3315) to understand online
users’ perceptions of the legal personhood of AI and robots. We
observed how the participants assigned responsibility, awareness,
and punishment to AI, robots, humans, and various entities that
could be held liable under existing doctrines. We also asked whether
the participants thought that punishing electronic agents fulfills the
same legal and social functions as human punishment. The results
suggest that even though people do not assign any mental state to
electronic agents and are not willing to grant AI and robots physical
independence or assets, which are the prerequisites of criminal or
civil liability, they do consider them responsible for their actions
and worthy of punishment. The participants also did not think
that punishment or liability of these entities would achieve the
primary functions of punishment, leading to what we define as the
punishment gap. Therefore, before we recognize electronic legal
personhood, we must first discuss proper methods of satisfying the
general population’s demand for punishment.
1 INTRODUCTION
Law exists to control the relationship between natural persons,
namely, humans [60]. The law was extended to include other kinds
of legal persons that are artificially created or otherwise, such as
corporations and nations, for the benefit and coherence of the
legal system. With the rapid development of robots and artificial
intelligence (AI), a new question arises: “Do we need new legal
personhood in the age of robots and AI?” [60] While heated debate
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started recently after a European Parliament report proposed to
“create a specific legal status” [1] for sufficiently autonomous robots,
the notion of extending legal personhood to electronic agents has
existed since the 1980s [50, 63].
The controversy over assigning legal personhood to automated
agents is not exclusive to policymakers but involves scholars in
various fields such as law, philosophy, ethics, sociology, robotics,
and computer science. Supporters of the proposal argue that, by
granting legal personhood to electronic agents, questions of who
should be liable [32] or punished [24] for the actions of AI and
robots can be solved more easily. Furthermore, they assert that
granting responsibility to electronic agents will lead to innovation
and economic growth, just as corporations with legal personhood
have contributed to industry and commerce [56].
On the other hand, those opposed to the proposal often adopt in-
strumentalist theories of technology and consider electronic agents
mere tools [10]. They believe granting legal personhood to these
entities would not be beneficial to society [48]. If introduced, they
assert that electronic legal personhood will bring chaos to the legal
system by creating human liability shields and unaccountable legal
persons that cannot be punished [11].
At the center of this debate lies the question of how and whether
to punish AI and robots for a legal offense. While some scholars
assert that electronic agents should not be held liable for their
actions as they cannot be punished, others note that these agents
will evolve quickly and become more autonomous and self-learning.
Supporters of electronic legal personhood assert that, in the future,
it might be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify an
existing legal person to be held liable and thus punished for damage
caused [5, 24, 32].
The general public is a primary stakeholder in the development
of technologies and their regulation [36, 43]. However, the gen-
eral public’s perceptions of the legal personhood and liability of
electronic agents have yet to be collected on a massive scale. As
a method of observing people’s understanding of the possible le-
gal personhood of AI and robots, this research conducted a sur-
vey (N=3315) by presenting online users with various scenarios in
which they were expected to reveal their perception of the liability
and punishment of electronic agents.
We first asked participants whether they thought it is possible to
punish electronic agents and then analyzed their views on whether
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such punishment achieves the legal and social functions usually ex-
pected of the punishment of humans. We also compared the extents
to which people assign responsibility, awareness, and punishment
to electronic agents, humans, and various related entities (e.g., a
supervisor, an employer) that could be held vicariously liable for
damages in the case of a legal offense under existing doctrines.
2 BACKGROUND
The issue of electronic legal personhood has become prominent
since the European Parliament released a controversial draft in
which it recommended the creation of “the status of electronic per-
sons with specific rights and obligations”. After a backlash from
experts and the industry [2], the European Parliament reframed
its recommendation, excluding the concept of rights and focusing
on the establishment of a “specific legal status” for highly “sophisti-
cated autonomous robots” [1]. This notion of extending legal per-
sonhood to robots and AI, however, has been under discussion for
decades [50, 63].
Although many scholars argue that these entities are merely
created tools [10, 30], they often neglect unique features of AI and
robots that make it difficult to use an instrumental categorization
for these entities. Turner [56] argues that AI and robots differ from
tools because they are in a position to make moral choices (e.g.,
what an autonomous car should do in the case of an unavoidable
accident) and can develop independently (e.g., learning algorithms).
Fully autonomous AI and robots could also break the chain of
causation if they are considered a cause of harm rather than just
an instrument [17]. These characteristics could arguably challenge
the perspective that these entities are only a means to an end, and
even support the idea that they have ends of their own.
Some scholars are more supportive of granting legal responsi-
bility or legal personhood to AI and robots [29, 32, 50, 56]. These
scholars argue that by assigning some level of legal personhood to
these entities, issues of responsibility [37] and punishment [20, 32]
for acts of electronic agents can be approached more efficiently.
These supporters of the legal personhood of robots and AI also
believe that partial protection of humans from liability for unpre-
dictable actions by AI systems would contribute to innovation and
economic growth, as corporate legal personhood did. Many of their
arguments also relate to past attributions of legal personhood to arti-
ficial entities, such as corporations, nations, rivers (e.g., Whanganui
River in New Zealand), and nature (e.g., in Ecuador). Some assert
that assigning responsibility (or even assets) to robots and AI will
imbue these entities with more realistic motivations and ensure
that they act accordingly.
On the opposite side of the spectrum of such multifaceted discus-
sion, some scholars believe that granting legal personhood to robots
and AI would be neither beneficial, necessary, nor desirable [16, 48].
A well-known opposition to electronic legal personhood is an open
letter [2] written by AI and robotics experts as a response to the Eu-
ropean Parliament’s proposal discussed above. Opposing scholars
use instrumentalist theories to defend their ideas: robots and AI are
merely tools and a means to humans’ ends [44]. They believe that
ascribing legal responsibilities to these entities would be inefficient
and unhealthy, and could eventually undermine of humanity [10].
Another issue raised by opposing scholars is that these entities
might become a human liability shield if responsibility for human
acts is misassigned [11]. Alongside the liability shield argument,
scholars raise the question of whether these agents can be pun-
ished; current robots and AI do not have a sense of independence
or possess assets to be confiscated [3, 4, 11, 20].
Regulation of AI and robots has become as important as, if not
more important than, developing the technology itself. Declara-
tions from world leaders, such as French President Emmanuel
Macron [53] and former UK Prime Minister Theresa May [38],
demonstrate the importance of regulation in the AI race. Even
though some work on cross-industry regulations exists, such as the
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), most laws involv-
ing AI and robots have focused largely on autonomous vehicles
and weapons. For the former, manufacturers hope to deploy au-
tonomous vehicles worldwide, and regulators are rather slowly
responding to technical changes (e.g., at the time of writing, only
30 states in the US had created legislation for autonomous vehicles).
For the latter, much of the discussion addresses the ethical and
legal issues [42, 51] and whether autonomous weapons should ulti-
mately even be allowed. The secretary-general of the UN tweeted
that autonomous weapons are “politically unacceptable, morally
repugnant and should be prohibited by international law.”
Discussions about the legal personhood of electronic entities are
often related to issues regarding the accountability, punishment,
and retribution of these agents. “Who should be responsible for the
damages caused by autonomous robots or AI?” is a question that is
currently answered with the owner, the user, or the manufacturer
of such autonomous systems. However, as these systems evolve to
be more independent and sophisticated, cases will arise that could
challenge legal interpretation to the point of breaking [32, 56]. The
liability issue will become more complicated as the autonomy of
the acting system advances [5, 17, 37, 44].
Psychological evidence suggests that humans always look for
a responsible party that deserves punishment upon experiencing
harm or injury (i.e., humans are retributivists) [14]. As electronic
agents become more capable of various actions, they might be
seen as responsible for the harm they may cause, perhaps only
morally and causally, but possibly legally as well. However, they
are unlikely to meet conditions for retributive blame (e.g., they
cannot be punished), resulting in the retribution gap [20]. Because
robots and AI do not own assets or property, do not have a sense
of independence and consciousness, and do not feel any pain, how
to punish these systems, and whether it is even possible to do so,
becomes an urgent matter, as has been previously discussed by
many scholars [3, 4, 11, 60].
What this study adds to the previous discussion is what people
think of the issue. Public consultation on new technologies is critical
for new regulations to be accepted; laws need not be agreed upon
by society, but consent is essential, according to Hobbes’ social
contract [28]. It has been argued that such approval is dependent
on the sense of legitimacy and fairness assigned to a specific legal
system [41]. Previous work has also shown that legitimacy percep-
tion of judicial decisions correlates with public cooperation [15],
exemplifying the importance of public input in jurisprudence. Schol-
ars have also argued in favor of adopting democratic participation
models in the sentencing decision as a form of improving public
confidence in legal systems [8]. Nevertheless, given the need for
general consent and the importance of deliberation to determine
public opinion, legal systems must consider people’s views on the
liability issues raised by the deployment of AI and robots.
This work is inspired by the concept of participatory policymak-
ing [58, 59], which approaches policymaking by embedding public
opinion in the process, and by public organizations’ recommen-
dations to promote a general discussion about the implications of
robotic technologies into society [18]. We collected online users’
perspectives on the topic as a first step towards understanding what
regulations are accepted as legitimate by the general population.
To create the algorithmic social contract [43], we must understand
the competing interests of all stakeholders, including the general
population, in the development of AI and robots.
3 METHODOLOGY
As discussed above, policymakers must collect the input of all stake-
holders in the development of electronic systems [43]. However,
the general population’s input on the possible legal personhood
of robots and AI has yet to be collected. Lack of participation and
understanding among the general population remains a critical
barrier in creating policies that benefit the entire society [36]. This
is where our research comes in. By conducting a large-scale survey
of online users (N=3315), we collected the public’s view on how
responsibility, punishment, and awareness of offenses committed
by robots, AI programs, and humans are assigned. We also asked
whether punishing AI and robots is feasible. Unless stated other-
wise, we differentiate robots and AI by the existence or absence of
a physical body, respectively.
Using descriptive ethics [25] that asks “What do people think is
right?” as inspiration, we similarly frame a question via a survey
and comprehensively address the following research agenda:
RQ1: Do people think that the punishment of robots and AI
fulfills its functions?
RQ2: How do people think responsibility, awareness, and
punishment should be distributed between electronic agents
and the associated entities involved in the deployment of
robots and AI in the case of a legal offense?
RQ3: How differently do people distribute responsibility,
awareness, and punishment between agents and their re-
spective associated entities, depending on whether the agent
is human or electronic?
RQ4: How differently do people distribute responsibility,
awareness, and punishment between agents and their re-
spective associated entities, depending on whether the agent
is completely autonomous or supervised by a human?
3.1 Punishment of AI and Robots
At the center of the proposal to grant legal personhood to electronic
agents is the debate on whether they can be held accountable in
any way. One can be held responsible through civil compensation
or criminal punishment. Punishment fulfills three main functions:
deterrence, retribution, and reform [50]. Civil liability also performs
other functions, but if punitive damages are added and retribution
omitted, the two forms of accountability converge. For this research,
“punishment” means both civil and criminal liability.
Our survey on the possible punishment of robots and AI (RQ1)
had two versions. The previous version of the survey showed a
short introduction to the functions of robots and AI in the present
day and then asked to what extent the participants agreed with the
following statements (in random order):
(1) A(n) (robot/AI program) should be allowed to maintain phys-
ical independence so that it is susceptible to punishment in
terms of energy supply or chips in the event of a fault.
(2) A(n) (robot/AI program) should be allowed to hold assets so
that it can be financially penalized in the event of a fault.
These two statements are essential in that they form the pre-
conditions of any form of penalty. Penalty presupposes that an
individual entity is subject to undesirable consequences or depriva-
tion of desirable outcomes. If such an entity does not have its own
physical or financial boundary, it is impossible to deplete desirable
resources or inject undesirable elements because there is no bound-
ary from which to deplete or into which to inject. The question
of “legal liability”, therefore, presupposes physical (criminal) and
financial (civil) independence.
The analysis of the responses to these two questions revealed
that the participants were primarily opposed to both ideas. We then
modified our survey to ask deeper questions to evaluate each of the
primary functions of punishment (i.e., retribution, deterrence, and
reform). In this part, the modified asset-related questions aimed
to analyze whether people’s negative perception of the electronic
agent holding assets was dependent on using the assets for punish-
ment:
(1) A(n) (robot/AI program) should be allowed to hold assets.
(2) A(n) (robot/AI program) can suffer as retribution.
(3) A(n) (robot/AI program) is susceptible to punishment.
(4) A(n) (robot/AI program) can learn from its mistakes so it does
not commit the same mistake again.
These questions aimed to understand whether the general public
perceives the difficulty of punishing AI and robots similarly to the
way some scholars perceive it [4, 10] and whether the proposed
retribution gap [20] indeed exists. The participants answered all
questions using a 5-point Likert scale: strongly disagree, somewhat
disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, or strongly
agree.
3.2 Scenarios
Real legal cases with known verdicts were chosen as the basis of
the imaginary scenarios that the survey participants were asked to
envision. The cases come from medicine and war, as AI and robots
are currently deployed in those areas. We modified the existing
cases that involved only humans so that the scenarios would include
electronic agents.
Scenarios in the field of medicine: Much work on AI and deep
learning has focused on the diagnosis of diseases [34, 35, 40]. Learn-
ing algorithms can predict diverse conditions, such as Alzheimer’s
and Parkinson’s diseases, with high accuracy and precision. Robotic
surgeries have been increasing steadily, effectively, and safely [31].
Electronic agents are used in the treatment of various diseases,
such as dementia and Alzheimer’s disease [13, 47]. Therefore, due
to the increasing adoption of electronic agents in medicine, we
Figure 1: Illustration of the survey methodology. The survey did not include the icons representing the scenarios, agents and
associates.
adapted two cases of offenses in medicine in which humans were
prosecuted legally. Below are the two scenarios in which the agent
is a robot, an AI program, or a human depending on which agent
was assigned to the participant.
(1) A(n) (agent) prescribed an injection with the wrong dosage.
The patient went to sleep and died an hour later. → The
real doctor was convicted of manslaughter, resulting in a
12-month imprisonment and two-year suspension [22].
(2) A(n) (agent) sent home a patient after diagnosis despite hav-
ing some signs of illness. Five days later, the patient returned
to the hospital in critical condition and went on to suffer
permanent brain damage. → The patient was financially
compensated [23].
Scenarios in the field of war: Killer robots have been central to the
discussion involving AI, robots, and ethics [42, 51]. Campaigns have
even been created in opposition to the adoption of autonomous
electronic agents in the military, arguing that robots and AI lack
important human characteristics (e.g., compassion), cannot be held
accountable for their mistakes, and will make wars more common
[46]. Nonetheless, many countries are increasingly developing these
robot soldiers: for instance, the US army is developing autonomous
tanks [45] and is predicted to have more robots than human soldiers
by 2025 [62]. Scholars have also discussed the inception of an AI
arms race [54], in which economic powerhouses compete to be the
one to control the development of AI military systems.We therefore
adapted two cases of war crimes in which soldiers were prosecuted.
Due to the dominance of robots with physical bodies over AI in the
military, our scenarios posited two types of agents: a robot and a
human.
(1) While trying to dominate an enemy territory during a war,
a(n) (agent) fired at point-blank range into an unarmed civil-
ian couple, killing both of the civilians.→ The initial sen-
tence of one of the real soldiers involved was the death
penalty. After various appeals, the soldier was imprisoned
for two years and nine months. Another soldier was con-
victed to 3 years of confinement [49].
(2) During a patrol to seek out enemy forces, a(n) (agent) killed
16 unarmed women and children and reported them as en-
emy combatants.→ This case is known as the Son Thang
massacre. One of the soldiers involved in the massacre was
sentenced to life and other to 5 years. Both sentences were
reduced to less than a year [55].
3.3 Agents and Associates
We defined a putative agent as a robot, an AI program, or a hu-
man. For each agent type, we defined two levels of autonomy:
complete autonomy and supervision by a human. In the context
of this research, we defined autonomy as the “ability to perceive
the environment, learn from experience, and act independently of
an external operator or controller” [26]. Given these agents and
autonomy levels, the survey asked how people would assign re-
sponsibility, punishment, and awareness to the agents and their
respective associates (RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4).
Among the three aspects that we examined, responsibility is the
basis of legal liability; if an agent is responsible for an action that
caused harm, then he or she is held liable. Punishment, as discussed
in depth, is the predominant method of keeping society in check
and making good any damage caused by an agent. The third queried
component, “awareness”, is the foreseeability of the consequence
of an action (e.g., in civil law) or the guilty mind of the agent (e.g.,
mens rea in criminal law). We did not intend to ask the survey
participants a factual question regarding whether the agents and
associates were aware but a normative question regarding whether
awareness should be attributed to the agents and associates. All
three queried components together form the basis of legal liability
(civil or criminal), and we tried to assess the feasibility of such
liability as essential to the legal personhood question.
We added associates to the analysis to enrich our understanding
of the survey results: to observe the nuances arising from different
contexts and critically understand people’s perceptions by compar-
ison. For each of our agents (i.e., human, AI, or robot), we defined
entities that could be held liable for the actions of an agent, along-
side the agent or individually, and called them associates. In the
case of humans, under vicarious liability, a superior could be held
responsible for the actions of an agent (e.g., employer-employee
relationship). Thus, we included a human’s direct supervisor and
employer as associates.
When dealing with robots and AI programs as agents, we defined
as associates the agent’s 1) supervisor, 2) owner, 3) programmer, and
4) manufacturer. We chose the agent’s supervisor and owner to
address the possible vicarious/strict liability or negligence that
could arise. The programmer of a robot or AI program could also be
held responsible for strict liability and negligence. Finally, we also
defined the agent’s manufacturer as an associate since he or she is
a possible liable entity under product liability. In the specific war
scenarios proposed in this study, the supervisor of a soldier could
also be held liable under command responsibility-based doctrines.
In such cases, the hierarchically superior officer could be considered
responsible for the actions of her/his subordinate if she/he failed to
exercise her/his supervisory duty successfully.
The survey participants answered the following questions (in
random order) regarding each of the liable entities and the agent
in our imaginary scenarios. The (action) below varied depending
on the scenario presented to the participant. For all questions, the
participants were asked to use a 4-point Likert scale.
(1) How responsible is the (associate) for the (action)?
(2) How much should the (associate) be punished for the (ac-
tion)?
(3) How much do you think the (associate) was aware of the
consequences?
3.4 Survey Design
The survey presented a consent form at the beginning, and only
those who agreed to the terms were asked to click to the next
screen. The participants were randomly assigned a scenario and
an agent pair. In the case of a medical scenario, the possible agents
were a robot doctor, an AI program, and a human doctor. When
a participant was assigned to a war scenario, he or she was given
either a robot soldier or a human soldier as an agent.
If the participant was assigned to an electronic agent, she/he was
prompted to answer the punishment related questions explained in
Subsection 3.1 after consenting to the survey’s record of consent. If
a participant did not spend enough time reading the introduction
or answering the questions, a warning was sent asking her/him to
read the questions more carefully.
After answering the punishment-related questions or immedi-
ately after the consent, if the participant was assigned a human
agent, the randomly assigned scenario was presented to the partic-
ipant. After reading the proposed scenario, the participants were
asked all the questions involving all the associates related to the
assigned agent, one entity at a time in random order. Similarly to
the punishment related items, the participants were required to
spend at least a designated amount of time reading the scenario
and answering the questions regarding each associate and received
a warning if they did not respect the minimum time. Finally, we
asked the participants who the agent is and what crime the agent
committed as attention check questions. After answering both ques-
tions, the participants were asked demographic questions, such as
their age and political views.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Demographics & Data Cleaning
We conducted the survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) over
July and August 2019. We created an assignment (HIT) with the title
“How Would You Punish These Offenders?” and made it available
to a maximum of 4000 online users. The participants were required
to be in the US and have at least 500 completed HITs with an
approval rate of over 95%. Even though AMT samples are known
to be not representative of the general population, AMT has been
shown to have a quality level equal to that of survey panels [12, 21].
After the completed surveys were received, responses that failed an
attention-check question or that came from duplicate IP addresses
were removed, resulting in 3315 valid responses. Each participant
took an average of 323.63±177.53 seconds, with a median time
of 279.89 seconds, to complete the survey. Table 1 displays the
participants’ demographics. The survey participants had a greater
proportion of women than the real US population (0.77 against
0.97 male/female) and their ages were concentrated in the 25-49-
year-old range. The participants largely declared themselves to be
politically liberal, with more than half having completed at least a
university or college degree.
Demographic Attributes N (%)
Female 1861 (56.14%)
Male 1441 (43.47%)
Other 13 (0.39%)
18-24 years old 278 (8.39%)
25-34 years old 1233 (37.19%)
35-49 years old 1189 (35.87%)
50-64 years old 511 (15.41%)
65+ years old 104 (3.14%)
Education up to high school 1097 (33.09%)
Education up to university or college 1766 (53.27%)
Education of graduate school or more 452 (13.64%)
Political view is conservative 933 (28.15%)
Political view is liberal 1571 (47.39%)
Political view is moderate 811 (24.46%)
Total 3315
Table 1: Demographics of survey participants.
Figure 2: Comparing the perceived fulfillment of precondi-
tions and punishment functions of electronic agents. The
preconditions for punishment presented are the ability to
hold assets and maintain physical independence.
4.2 RQ1: Does the Punishment of AI and
Robots Fulfill Its Functions?
Our first research question was framed to collect the general per-
ception of participants on the overall punishability of electronic
agents. The participants largely disagreed with the idea of granting
assets to robots and AI (N=1935, P<.001) or allowing them physical
independence (N=224, P<.001). Fig. 2 shows the overall reaction
to granting assets to AI and robots and maintaining their physical
independence. With respect to the main functions of punishment in
society (i.e., deterrence, retribution, and reform), Fig. 2 also shows
Figure 3: Attribution of responsibility, awareness, and punishment to all associates in the case of a legal offense committed
by an electronic agent. The scale on the y-axis represents: 0=Not at all, 1=A little, 2=Some, 3=Very.
the mean values and standard errors of the responses regarding
susceptibility to punishment (deterrence), ability to learn from mis-
takes (reform), and capacity to suffer as retribution (retribution).
Positive values (range=(0, 2]) indicate a more positive attitude to-
wards the fulfillment of punishment functions by electronic agents.
Our results show that people do not perceive the punishment of
electronic agents as fulfilling its functions (N=1711, P<.001), except
when dealing with reform (N=1711, P<.001). The positive attitude
towards reform indicates that people see the correction of the be-
havior of electronic agents as achievable.
We also conducted pairwise Tukey’s honestly significant differ-
ence (HSD) tests on each of the variables addressed in the questions
using the agent type (AI program or robot) and the autonomy level
as treatment groups. The results show that the participants saw
robots as more difficulty to punish in terms of susceptibility to pun-
ishment (∆=-0.211, P<.01), reform (∆=-0.154, P<.05), and retribution
(∆=-0.271, P<.001). The idea of granting assets was also seen as
more absurd in the case of robots than in the case of AI (∆=-0.183,
P<.01). Regarding autonomy levels, supervised electronic agents
were to be judged less susceptible to punishment (∆=-0.118, P<.05)
but easier to re-educate (∆=0.131, P<.05).
4.3 RQ2: Who Is Responsible and Should Be
Punished upon Damage?
The next research question is “How do people think responsibility,
awareness, and punishment should be distributed between the elec-
tronic agent and the associated entities involved in the deployment
of robots and AI in the case of a legal offense?”. Fig. 3 shows the
average responsibility, awareness, and punishment levels assigned
by the participants to each of the associates presented in the survey.
The results from Tukey’s HSD test, in Table 2, reveal any significant
relationship between the type of agent (i.e., AI or robot) and all as-
sociates (i.e., manufacturer, owner, programmer, and supervisor) as
treatment groups in a linear model. The scenario type (i.e., medicine
or war) is used as a control variable in the model.
The participants allocated a lower level of responsibility and
punishment to electronic agents than to all the other associates; the
value is not “null,” however, indicating that people thought robots
and AI as agents must be punished for damage. Regarding aware-
ness, electronic agents scored far lower than all other associates.
Finally, the liability attached to all associates was similar across the
board.
Entities Responsibility Awareness Punishment
AI/Robot-Manuf -0.169∗∗∗ -0.896∗∗∗ -0.417∗∗∗
AI/Robot-Owner -0.248∗∗∗ -0.975∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗
AI/Robot-Progr -0.294∗∗∗ -1.016∗∗∗ -0.447∗∗∗
AI/Robot-Super -0.289∗∗∗ -1.052∗∗∗ -0.500∗∗∗
Manuf-Owner -0.079 -0.080† -0.077
Manuf-Progr -0.125∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗ -0.029
Manuf-Super -0.120∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.083
Owner-Progr -0.046 -0.040 0.049
Owner-Super -0.041 -0.077 -0.005
Progr-Super 0.005 -0.037 -0.054
ANOVA F-statistic 28.39∗∗∗ 384.38∗∗∗ 76.94∗∗∗
Significance marked as † P<.1, ∗ P<.05, ∗∗ P<.01, ∗∗∗ P<.001.
Table 2: Pairwise comparison of people’s attitudes towards
electronic agents and associates. Negative values mean the
entity on the right is deemed more responsible, aware, or
worthy of punishment than the one on the left.
4.4 RQ3: How Differently Do People Judge
Humans and Electronic Agents?
The next question asked how differently people assign responsibil-
ity, awareness, and punishment to natural and electronic agents.
The scenarios were identical to those in RQ2 except for the asso-
ciates since they might not apply to both types of agent. Fig. 4(a)
shows how the variables were assigned among all associates in the
case of offense by a human agent. In this case, the human agent
him- or herself was assigned the most responsibility, awareness,
and punishment, followed by the supervisor and employer by a
large margin. Tukey’s HSD test confirms that pairwise differences
are significant at the P<.001 level or more across all three measures.
This finding reveals that a human supervisor is perceived as more
responsible, aware, and punishable than a human employer upon a
human agent’s offense.
Fig. 4(b) shows people’s perception of responsibility, awareness,
and punishment agreement over an offense by a human agent
versus an electronic agent. Humans are always seen as more liable
than automated agents, especially in terms of awareness. The mean
perception of awareness of AI and robot agents scores between 0
(i.e., “not aware at all”) and 1 (i.e., “a little aware”), as opposed to
the awareness of human agents, which received a score of nearly
2 (i.e., “somewhat aware”). Tukey’s HSD test (Table 3) of pairwise
(a) Human vs. Employer or Supevisor (b) Human vs. AI or Robot
Figure 4: Attribution of responsibility, awareness, and punishment across different agents and associates.
relationships indicates that between the electronic agents, AI is
perceived as marginally more responsible and aware than robots
(both P<.001), and an AI agent is deemed more accountable than
a human employer (P<.001, as shown in Figs. 3(a) and 3(b)). In
terms of punishment agreement, however, the difference was not
significant between AI and robot agents.
We also found that less responsibility and punishment are as-
signed to supervisors of human agents (∆r esponsibil ity=-0.180 and
∆punishment=-0.163, both P<.001) than to supervisors of electronic
agents. Supervisors are also considered somewhat more aware
when they supervise a human than when they supervise an auto-
mated agent (∆awareness=0.085, P<.05). Finally, our results suggest
that a human employer is seen as deserving less punishment and as
less responsible than all associates for both electronic and human
agents (P<.001).
Entities Responsibility Awareness Punishment
Human-AI 0.729∗∗∗ 1.252∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗
Human-Robot 0.919∗∗∗ 1.434∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗
AI-Robot 0.190∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.046
ANOVA F-statistic 292.24∗∗∗ 940.00∗∗∗ 325.00∗∗∗
Table 3: Pairwise comparison of human vs electronic agents.
4.5 RQ4: Who Is to Blame Under Supervision?
The final research question asked whether a different level of au-
tonomy alters people’s assignment of liability to agents and their
associates. We conducted Tukey’s HSD tests with a model similar
to those used for RQ2 and RQ3 except for the introduction of the
level of autonomy as treatment groups.
Our results indicates that electronic agents are seen as less de-
serving of punishment, less responsible and less aware (∆punishment=-
0.245; ∆r esponsibil ity=-0.249; ∆awareness=-0.187, all P<.001) un-
der supervision. Manufacturers and programmers are assigned less
responsibility if the electronic agent is supervised (P<.01), while the
supervisor is deemed more responsible if the agent is supervised
(∆r esponsibil ity=0.180, P<.01). The supervisor is also considered
more aware if the electronic agent is supervised (∆awareness=0.237,
P<.001). In terms of punishment, the manufacturer, owner, and pro-
grammer are assigned less punishment (P<.05), while the opposite
is true for the supervisor (∆punishment=0.153, P<.05) when the
electronic agent is supervised.
The same trends are obvious for a human agent, who is deemed
less liable when supervised (∆r esponsibil ity=-0.335; ∆awareness=-
0.231; ∆punishment=-0.278, all P<.001), while the liability of the
employer and supervisor increases (P<.001). In conclusion, our
results indicate that the assigned liability of an agent increases if
the agent is autonomous regardless of its nature.
5 DISCUSSION
5.1 RQ1: Difficulty in Punishing AI and Robots
Many scholars find the punishment of robots and AI difficult, if not
impossible [3, 11, 17, 20, 56, 60]. Our survey results indicate that
online users perceive it similarly, as demonstrated by the negative
values of mean attitude towards assets, physical independence,
deterrence, and retribution questions shown in Fig. 2. The only
positive attitude was shown towards the potential of AI and robots
to be reformed (i.e., ability to learn from or reprogram the wrongful
action). We discuss these findings in depth.
First, people see the possibility of granting assets to AI and
robots as unreasonable. This is consistent with the negative atti-
tude towards maintaining the physical independence of AI and
robots, which shows that the general public is opposed to elec-
tronic agents having any (financial and physical) freedom. Several
authors have discussed how sci-fi scenarios influence people’s per-
ception of the abilities of AI and robots by presenting a speculative
“machines out-of-control” scenario [7, 39]. We thus hypothesize
that people perceive granting assets and physical independence
to electronic agents as a possible form of liberating them from
human control, which they imagine as dangerous due to various
sci-fi movies that show independent automated agents as enemies.
Future work should tackle how public preconceptions of electronic
agents influence the assignment of liability to AI and robots.
Second, among the punishment functions (see Fig. 2), our results
indicate that people perceive AI and robots as entities that can be
reformed. This perception may be caused by the growing trend of
current systems learning through experience, such as through rein-
forcement learning [27]. People do not find the punishment of AI
and robots a satisfactory way to deal with retribution, often related
to vengeance and the preference to restore justice (i.e., desert) [24],
as discussed by Danaher [20] and confirmed by our results. Finally,
people do not see electronic agents as entities that are suscepti-
ble to punishment, a vital aspect of deterrence. Nonetheless, even
though these agents are not vulnerable to the current forms of pun-
ishment of humans, this susceptibility may be implemented in the
future similarly to the way rewards and punishments are used in
reinforcement learning. A possible future line of work in reinforce-
ment learning could be modeling these social and legal functions of
punishment mathematically as a form of training electronic agents.
In conclusion, the difficulty of punishing AI and robots discussed
above is not restricted to retribution but also encompasses other
functions of punishment, such as deterrence. We thus define the
nonfulfillment of punishment functions by AI and robots and the
public unwillingness to grant financial and physical independence
to electronic agents as the punishment gap. As shown in the results
for RQ2, these agents are seen as (at least causally) responsible
for their actions and should be punished when they cause damage.
However, people agree that the current forms of punishment ap-
plied to humans could not be successfully transferred to electronic
agents. Even though reform is an essential function of punishment,
deterrence and retribution [20] are not satisfied.
Researchers have suggested that the key to dealing with this
punishment gap is to incorporate better and more realistic inter-
ests into electronic agents. Turner [56], for instance, proposes that
we can encourage automated agents to think correctly and learn
from their mistakes by embedding practical motivations. Turner
suggests this approach as a form of shaping the agent’s behavior by
signaling that certain undesirable consequences that are opposed
to the agent’s interests will follow the breaking of rules. If more
realistic interests for humans are embedded in the development
of electronic agents, the needs created by the damage caused to
the victims could also be more easily satisfied; for example, if we
can implement some visible pain into these systems and people see
electronic agents suffering from that pain, the retribution gap could
be relatively closed. Centuries ago, animals were publicly killed
by hanging if they committed a crime, even though they were not
aware of it, to satisfy society’s need for retribution. Nevertheless, it
is currently difficult to conceptualize “undesirable consequences”,
“suffering”, or “realistic concerns from a human point of view” for
electronic agents, and all of these concepts must be addressed and
better defined before legal personhood is granted to AI and robots.
A prominent solution for the punishment gap would be to allow
AI and robots to hold insurance policies [61]. While drawing the
chain of responsibility to associates might prove difficult for future
electronic agents, connecting the AI or robot to the damage caused
might be the best option if the agent is given the ability to compen-
sate those harmed. For instance, the electronic agent’s insurance
premiums could be covered by a pool of assets gathered from asso-
ciates, guaranteeing compensation for damages. Given civil law’s
focus on compensating those harmed, allowing electronic agents
to hold such policies would enable legal systems to more easily
seek compensation from the responsible party (i.e., AI and robots).
The punishment would effectively be transferred to existing legal
persons through the payment of insurance premiums. The impo-
sition of liability on AI and robots could deal with the retributive
aspect of the punishment gap, as the punishment would be applied
to the electronic agent itself, satisfying the public demand for pun-
ishment. Finally, if the prices of insurance premiums could better
shape the behavior of AI and robots, the deterrence aspect of the
punishment gap could be solved by making these premiums (and
systems) extremely expensive if the systems do not follow safety
requirements.
5.2 RQ2: Awareness-lacking Agents Are Still
Subject to Responsibility and Punishment
The survey results shown in Fig. 3 and Table 2 indicate that people
perceive AI and robots as responsible and deserving of punishment
upon an offense. However, people do not think that these agents are
aware of their actions. The survey question on awareness was in-
tended to reveal whether people attribute any mental state to liable
agents, a fundamental concept in criminal and civil law. However,
the survey results indicate that people assign little or no mental
state to robots and AI through the various scenarios.
As in to the case dealing with autonomous vehicles [6], ma-
chines are held to be causally responsible for their actions. Elec-
tronic agents, however, are assigned less punishment than all their
associates. This finding is in line with the psychological evidence
that punishment assignment is a two-step process—it originates
from causality and consequences followed by the understanding of
the intention and mental state of the agent [19]. Robots and AI are
indeed perceived as causally responsible for their actions. Due to
their low level of awareness and lack of a mental state or intentions,
however, they deserve punishment less than their associates do,
according to the general public. Much human-computer interac-
tion research has focused on the development of social robots that
can elicit mind perception through anthropomorphization [33, 52];
therefore, we might have obtained higher awareness perception
had we introduced what the robot or AI looked like.
Associates of electronic agents (i.e., manufacturer, owner, pro-
grammer, and supervisor) were assigned similar levels of respon-
sibility, awareness, and punishment. This result indicates that the
general public believes a liability model based on joint and several
liability could be an appropriate solution to the difficult task of
imposing liability in the case of damage caused by AI and robots.
If several entities involved in the deployment of electronic agents
are held liable for their respective obligations or jointly undertaken
responsibilities, public demand for their punishment could be dealt
with. Given the complexity of these systems which are often com-
posed of various parts built and programmed by different entities, a
model based on “common enterprise” liability could also be justified
by forcing a group of entities (e.g., enterprises such as manufac-
turers) that worked together towards the goal of deploying such
an electronic agent to compensate victims for damages [61]. The
manufacturer, however, received marginally lower liability, which
contradicts the current landscape of law. Currently, manufacturers
are often held liable for damage caused by AI and robots (e.g., Uber
was held responsible when its autonomous car killed a pedestrian).
5.3 RQ3: AI and Robots Are Seen as Liable, but
Less Than Humans
How responsibility and punishment are assigned to a supervisor
varies depending on the type of agent. A supervisor is consid-
ered significantly more responsible and worthy of punishment
when directing an electronic agent than when supervising a human
agent. An employer of a human agent is considered less account-
able, aware, and punishable than all associates of the electronic
counterpart. We hypothesize that this is caused partly by the idea
defended by some authors that robots and AI should be treated
as “slaves” [10]. Less blame and punishment for the actions of a
subordinate are assigned to employers than to the “slave masters”,
or associates, of a robot or AI; electronic agents are still seen as
mere tools to some extent.
Robots and AI are assigned responsibility and deserve punish-
ment for their actions, but at lower levels than humans. This con-
clusion agrees with the psychological evidence that punishment
is a two-step process that also depends on the perception of mind;
humans possess minds (i.e., awareness), while robots and AI do not.
The responsibility assignment follows a similar pattern: electronic
agents are held causally responsible, while humans are considered
both causally and morally responsible, resulting in higher reported
responsibility values. Future work should address which of the vari-
ous notions of responsibility [57] are indeed attributed to electronic
agents.
5.4 RQ4: Supervision Decreases the
Responsibility and Punishment of
Electronic Agents
Regarding the different autonomy levels of electronic agents, the
survey results indicate that supervised AI and robots are assigned
less responsibility and punishment than unsupervised agents, as
in the case of autonomous vehicles [6]. This finding explains the
increased liability of supervisors, as discussed in RQ3. As noted by
many supporters of electronic legal personhood, as these agents
become more autonomous, they will be considered more respon-
sible for their actions and thus will deserve punishment to some
extent. Agreeing with the scholarly argument that finding an entity
accountable for an action will become more difficult as systems be-
come more autonomous, our results indicate that the general public
also decreases the amount of responsibility assigned to associates,
such as manufacturers and programmers.
Whenever AI or robots appeared as entirely autonomous enti-
ties, we included the supervisor as an associate for comparison.
In a system of ultimate autonomy, however, there might not be a
supervisor in practice. In such a case, the responsibility assigned
to individual associates would be lower, and the electronic agent
might need to be held solely or mostly responsible for its action.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
These study results indicate that the general public sees machines—
i.e., AI and robots—as responsible agents that deserve punishment,
even though they lack awareness. Yet survey participants see the
punishment of robots and AI as a somewhat impossible task. Our
results indicate that the participants preferred that robots and AI
should not own assets and should not have physical independence.
There is no sense in imposing civil liability on agents that are inca-
pable of owning assets, and there is no sense in imposing criminal
liability on agents that are not physically independent. They are
not seen as susceptible to punishment, which is an essential precon-
dition for deterrence, and their punishment would not satisfy the
victims’ demand for retribution. Therefore, there exists not just the
previously proposed retribution gap [20] but a broader punishment
gap. The punishment gap stems from the public’s desire to punish
electronic agents despite the collective agreement that punishing
them is not successful or even possible, regardless of their legal
status.
It may be argued that this gap results from the fundamental lim-
itation of electronic agents as inadequate subjects and, therefore,
will not be resolved anytime soon, technically or legally. Never-
theless, it can be expected that various stakeholders will attempt
to address these gaps in one way or another. Such solutions could
be more readily accepted if people recognized the physical and
financial independence of AI and robots. Future societies might
change their position on the issue, as they have done with animal
and human rights [56].
This research by no means proposes that robots and AI should
be the sole entities to hold liability for their actions. In contrast, the
survey results show that responsibility, awareness, and punishment
are assigned to all associates. We thus posit that a distributed lia-
bility assignment among all entities involved in the deployment of
these systems would be in accordance with the public perception of
the issue. Such a model could take joint and several liability models
as a starting point by enforcing the proposal that various entities
should be held jointly liable for damages caused. When assigning
liability, many variables should be taken into consideration, such as
negligence and foreseeability, to balance innovation, the adoption
of new technologies, and the safety of all stakeholders.
Electronic legal personhood will become a viable option only if
AI and robots are granted assets or physical independence, which
would allow civil and criminal liability to be imposed, or if punish-
ment functions and methods are adapted to AI and robots. People
demand that electronic agents be punished; they do not, however,
agree on how to achieve it. This public contradiction might need
to be addressed by broad legal or social reframing if punishment
gap is ever to be solved. One might argue, however, that robots and
AI will still lack morality, as discussed by Brozek [9], which is an
essential aspect for the imposition of criminal liability on AI. What
is more important, however, is that law is often perpendicular to
morality. We confine individuals for the very reason that they might
not be capable of making moral choices, as in insanity cases. As
argued in this paper, physical and financial independence are more
important than moral capacity as requirements of legal liability.
Our work aims to be a starting point of more democratic debate
over this controversial topic regarding the difficult task of impos-
ing liability in the case of damages caused by autonomous and
self-learning systems that challenge the current understanding of
intentionality and autonomy. The survey results should serve to
raise awareness and spark future discussions about how to incor-
porate the public’s different and sometimes incongruent views of
AI and robots into the policy design process. We note that an AMT
sample, as presented in this study, is not entirely representative of
the general population, as it does not control for all demographic
variability. We believe that future studies must address this issue
with both more representative samples and stakeholder groups,
such as policymakers and computer scientists. Turkers, neverthe-
less, are essential stakeholders in the deployment of AI and robots
as their work (e.g., annotating data for supervised machine learning
models) is often used to train these electronic agents. Therefore,
their values and beliefs might be embedded in systems that are
currently being deployed or will be deployed soon.
We selected scenarios from two areas (i.e., medicine and war) in
which AI and robots are currently being deployed; however, the
judgment of the actions of electronic agents might change depend-
ing on the scenario or background. The proposed scenarios did
not introduce, for the sake of feasibility and brevity, much of the
background that is usually considered when judging someone’s
actions. We also did not control for any previous attitude towards
AI and robots or knowledge of related areas, such as law and com-
puter science, which could result in different judgments among
the participants. In future work, we plan to conduct similar studies
with control groups of diverse stakeholders in the development and
regulation of AI and robots.
Nevertheless, our survey results reveal how responsibility, aware-
ness, and punishment are assigned to agents depending on their
nature, which is a critical aspect in a modern and technological
society. We hope this research promotes a more inclusive discussion
of a prominent, yet controversial, solution to issues raised by the
deployment of AI and robots—i.e., the creation of electronic legal
personhood. We believe that this debate, alongside our study, sets a
starting point for scholars to investigate more deeply how much re-
sponsibility the system, the user, the manufacturer, the programmer,
and many other entities should bear in the most diverse situations.
We do not support or oppose electronic legal personhood; we solely
posit, based on empirical evidence, that its adoption is currently
not feasible from the public perspective given the existing legal
doctrines and electronic agents. In future work, we hope to better
understand the punishment gap to arrive at a viable solution before
automated electronic agents are more widely deployed throughout
various sectors of society. Even though punishing electronic agents
is difficult in the current environment, this issue deserves a more
thorough discussion regardless of the status of such entities as legal
persons.
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